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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Collection of Garbage and Rubbish -
A Governmental Function
The hazards of modern life in the big city were illustrated during
this survey period by Broaghton v. City of Cleveland.1 A lady was hit
by a wooden box being thrown onto the City of Cleveland's garbage
truck by city employees. The Ohio Supreme Court said It was a govern-
mental and not a proprietary function, so there is no liability on the
City's part.
The case is in line with the majority of states on this matter, and
resolves several conflicting court of appeals decisions. The court dis-
tinguished those cases holding that sewer maintenance and repair are
proprietary functions, and apparently overruled the old case of City of
Cleveland v. Russo.2
But It May Not Make a Nuisance of Itself
While It Goes About It
Thousands of Greater Clevelanders breathed sighs of relief and for-
gave the courts everything during 1957-1958, when they put an end to
50 years of rubbish-burning on Cleveland's municipal lake front dump.
An irate and public-spirited taxpayer, represented by a determined
young lawyer, brought an action to restrain and enjoin the constant burn-
ing of rubbish thereon. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals en-
joined such acts as a public nuisance, which no claimed "emergency" on
the part of the city could justify, found that sanitary land fill is a proper
and safe method of disposal of such material, and stated that "the City
of Cleveland is not above the law."3
The Supreme Court refused certiorari, and what is even more of in-
terest to lawyers, the trial court subsequently awarded to the plaintiff's
lawyer a fee of $25,000.00 Virtue not only triumphed, it was re-
warded!
No Tax Exemption of Municipally Owned Off-Street
Parking Facilities
The City of Columbus acquired land and constructed a public parking
facility thereon, pursuant to its home-rule power,4 rather than under the
1. 167 Ohio St. 29, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1957).
2. 98 Ohio St. 465, 121 N.E. 901 (1918).
3. Neubauer v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), motion to
certify overruled February 19, 1958.
4. OwIo CoNsT. Art XVIII § 3. See State, ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio
St. 81, 100 NE.2d 255 (1951).
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provisions of Revised Code Section 717.05. The latter contains a pro-
vision stating that:
Real estate acquired under this section shall not be tax exempt.
The city contended that since it had not acquired the facility under
Section 717.05 it was exempt from taxation by virtue of the provisions of
Section 5709.08.1
Conceding that the property was used exclusively for a public purpose,
the Supreme Court6 pointed out that to grant exemption as to facilities
acquired by virtue of home-rule powers and to deny it as to those ac-
quired under Section 717.05:
.. would lead to a discrimination and legal absurdity not to be contem-
plated, particularly in view of the requirement of Section 26 of Article II
of the Ohio Constitution that all laws of a general nature shall have a uni-
form operation throughout the state.
Sections 717.05 and 5709.08 must be construed in pari mteria.
But A Municipal Transit System Is Exempt
In City of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals7 the Supreme Court
was not faced with reconciling two apparently conflicting statutes, but
rather with determining to overrule or follow its own decision8 that real
and personal property owned and used by the City of Cleveland in operat-
ing its mass transportation system was not exempt from taxation.
The Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision and held exempt the
portion of the transit system's property so used, stating that the property
met the test of exclusiveness and that neither the making of a charge
to the public for rides nor the fact that the system might show a profit
forbade exemption. The Court's syllabus overruled Zangerle v. City of
Cleveland.9
Annexation and Detachment Are Not Within Home Rule
A group of residents of the Village of Beechwood in Cuyahoga
County filed a petition with the County Board of Elections, for the de-
tachment of a certain portion of the village territory and its formation
5. "Real or personal property belonging to the state or United States used exclu-
sively for a public purpose, and public property used exclusively for a public purpose,
shall be exempt from taxation .... "
6. City of Columbus v. County of Franklin, 167 Ohio St. 256, 147 N.E.2d 625
(1958). See discussion in TAXATIoN section, iMfra.
7. 167 Ohio St. 263, 147 N.E.2d 663 (1958). See TAXATION section, infra.
8. Zangerle v. City of Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1943).
9. Ibid.
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into a new and separate township. The petition conformed to the pro-
visions of the state statutes ° relating to detachment, but not to certain
special provisions of Beechwood's charter relating thereto.
The question came before the Supreme Court on appeal by the
village from an order of the trial court refusing to grant an injunction
against the holding of the election." The court held that the power of
local self government granted to municipal corporations by Article XVIII
of the Ohio Constitution relates solely to the government and administra-
tion of the internal affairs of the municipality. When a proceeding is
such that it affects not only the municipality itself -but the surrounding
territory beyond its boundaries, such proceeding is no longer one which
falls within the sphere of local self-government, but one which must
be guided by the general law of the state. Similarly, to detach territory
and diminish the boundaries of a municipal corporation affects adjacent
areas, in that it either increases the size of an existing township or creates
a new one. Therefore detachment is a matter of state-wide legislative
concern, exclusively within the control of the General Assembly.
Other Annexation Matters
The case of State ex rel, Maxson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Frank-
lin County2 there came before the Supreme Court the problem of con-
flicting petitions for the annexation to separate municipal corporations of
adjoining township territory.
First came a petition for the annexation to the City of Grandview
Heights of 426 acres of adjoining Franklin Township. Two weeks later
there was another petition for the annexation to Columbus of 910
acres of Franklin Township. Both were signed by a majority of free-
holders residing in the territory sought to be annexed. Presumably each
bore many of the same signatures, proving what every lawyer already
knows - most people will sign anything.
The Board of Commissioners held a hearing on the first petition and
voted 'by a majority to grant the petition for annexation to Grandview
Heights. An application was then made for a rehearing, which was
granted, and on rehearing the first petition was dismissed and on the con-
tinued rehearing of the Columbus petition for annexation the board
granted it.
The Supreme Court 'held that the Board of County Commissioners
had statutory jurisdiction, in the face of a petition for a writ of prohibi-
10. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 709.38, 709.39.
11. Village of Beechwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921
(1958).
12. 167 Ohio St. 458, 149 N.E.2d 918 (1958).
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tion, to reconsider its action, deny the first petition and grant the second
The court did not have before it the correctness or reasonableness of the
board's decision. Apparently, the court did not feel that the granting of
the Grandview Heights petition was a dismissal and termination of the
Columbus petition for it approved the action of the board in reviving
and granting the latter petition.
The case seems to decide that the point at which the commissioners
could no longer act would be either the institution of court proceedings
attacking its decision to approve annexation or the expiration of time
allowed for the institution of such proceedings.' 3
Tax Levies By Charter Amendment
For consideration in Sinclair v. City of Lakewood14 were the ques-
tions: (1) whether the provisions of Section 741.09, Revised Code, are
the exclusive method of financing deficits in a municipal firemen's re-
lief and pension fund,15 (2) whether the issue of the amendment of a
municipal charter must be submitted to the electorate at a regular Novem-
ber election and (3) whether a charter amendment authorizing a tax
levy in excess of constitutional (or charter) limitations may be sub-
mitted at other than a November election and passed by a bare majority,
it being admitted that the question of a levy if submitted at other times
requires more than a majority for passage.
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County ruled (1) that deficits
in such pension funds may be made up by operating levies for such
purpose; (2) that a charter amendment need not be voted on at regular
November election and; (3) that a charter amendment authorizing tax
levies may be submitted at other than a general November election and
passed by a bare majority, the provisions of Revised Code Section 5705.18
not being applicable.'"
Municipal Inspection of Buildings
A question of far-reaching import, both to municipalities and to the
law of search and seizure, was decided by the Supreme Court in State
ex rel., Eaton v. Prior.'7 An ordinance of the City of Dayton established
13. OHIo REv. CODE § 709.04.
14. 151 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
15. See OHIO REV. CODE § 741.40 for the equivalent section for police relief and
pension funds.
16. Under this section a charter may be framed to permit the submission to the
voters of an operating levy, and the passage thereof by a bare majority at a Novem-
ber election.
17. 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958). See 10 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 304
(1959).
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certain minimum building standards for safeguarding the health and safety
of the occupants thereof, and required that:
The owner or occupant of every dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house
and rooming unit... shall give the Housing Inspector free access to such
dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit and its premises
at any reasonable hour for the purpose of such inspection, examination
and survey.
Violation of any provision of the ordinance was a misdemeanor. One
Taylor refused to admit a housing inspector to Taylor's premises without
a search warrant. He was charged with violation of the ordinance be-
cause of his refusal to admit the inspector and timely raised the question
of constitutionality. The trial court held the particular provision of
the ordinance unconstitutional, which was reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals for Montgomery County.1 8
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the ordinance as applied to
the facts of the case before it. It relied upon Section 3 of Artide XVIII
of the Ohio Constitution and Section 715.26 and 715.29 of the Revised
Code, and the latter two being legislative authorizations for municipal
councils to enact and enforce building regulations, but recognized that
the real question was whether the ordinance was attempting to permit an
unconstitutional and unreasonable search and seizure.
There are conflicting authorities on the subject. The case of District
of Columbia v. Little'9 held the search unlawful, the case of Richards v.
City of Columbia20 reached the opposite conclusion. Both were reached
by divided courts.
The Ohio Supreme Court pointed out that the District of Columbia
regulation had been "loose and vague" and contrasted it with the care with
which the Dayton ordinance was drawn, and pointed out that when the
case reached the United States Supreme Court2l that body had preferred
to sustain the decision of the appellate court on other than constitutional
grounds, and that Burton and Reed, J.J., dissenting had indicated that
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Likewise, the South Carolina case was not the firmest precedent, for
on its facts there had been no entrance of any premises by the enforce-
ment officer over the objection of the inhabitant. A Maryland case
actually had to make its own determination. It upheld the law, pointing
18. 152 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
19. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
20. 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
21. 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
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is squarely in point and upheld the search.2 2 So the Ohio Supreme Court
out that the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not
apply to the states and that the nature of the case made the search reason-
able rather than unreasonable. Therefore, there was no violation of Sec-
tion 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
Home Rule - Civil Service
The Supreme Court, in State ex rel., Canada v. Phillips,23 sustained a
provision in the Columbus City Charter to the effect that in filling posi-
tions in the competitive classified service the civil service commission
shall certify to the appointing authority the names of the three candidates
standing highest on the eligible list for appointment and that the ap-
pointing authority shall appoint one of the three. The city was not re-
quired to follow the provisions of Section 143.34 of the Revised Code.
In view of State ex rel. Lynch vs. City of Cleveland,24 the Phillips
case was not a great leap forward. Significant, however, is the number
of restrictive cases expressly overruled by the Supreme Court, which also
"questioned" and "distinguished" syllabi of others. Significant also is
the dictum that the right to deviate from state statutes may exist not only
by a charter provision but also by legislative provisions enacted by -its
council.
Mayor May Vote To Break A Tie
The Court of Appeals for Summit County determined in Babyak et al.
v. Alten,25 that under the provisions of Section 733.24, Revised Code, the
mayor, as president of the legislative authority, has the power to vote
on an ordinance or resolution in case of a tie on either an ordinance or
a resolution. An earlier Supreme Court case2" had held that the president
of council in a city operating under the statutory plan could vote on the
election of council clerk in the case of a tie. The recent case, of course,
goes much further in permitting the presiding officer to vote on legisla-
tive matters.
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22. Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
23. 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
24. 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956).
25. 154 N.E.2d 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
26. State ex rel. Roberts v. Snyder, 149 Ohio St. 333, 78 N.E.2d 716 (1948).
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